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As a legacy of World War II, we have harrowing fictionalized and fictional stories from 
survivors and novelists, such as Imre Kertész's Fatelessness. Fatelessness chronicles a year of Georg 
Koves' life, a year he spends in various concentration camps. Prior to his deportment and subsequent 
incarceration, Georg lived in Bucharest, a normal fifteen-year-old with a total indifference to his Jewish 
heritage. The first few chapters of the novel detail equally his sense of awkward sadness when his 
father goes to a labor camp, and the excitement of his first romance. Georg is an almost boring teenage 
boy, prone to obedient behavior. His divorced parents fight over custody ceaselessly, with Georg rarely 
objecting; his needy stepmother's demands make him feel exceptionally awkward, but he rarely 
questions her instructions. When captured by Nazis on the way to his factory job, Georg submits 
quietly. He never attempts to escape the camps and wonders at those who do. While he lies about his 
age at the advice of another prisoner in order to fulfill the working age, he does so because he wants the 
opportunity to work—not from a canny survival instinct. Georg spends most of his time in the camps 
feeling tired, and deeply appreciates a stint in the infirmary. Freedom arrives when the camps 
disintegrate at the end of the war, and Georg, in some clothes stolen from a farmhouse, returns to 
Bucharest. The closing chapters of the book show his deepest contemplations on his time in the camps, 
as a journalist and some old family friends question him about his experience and receive answers they 
do not expect—and do not want—to hear. 
Western culture remains to this day inundated with novels and plays about the genocide 
perpetrated by Germany's Nazi government. As a culture, perhaps we feel that this saturation atones for 
a collective failure to recognize and halt crimes of humanity. The art we discover from forays into the 
Holocaust provides a window not only into that moment in history, but also into the history of genocide 
in other areas of the world. Both art contemporaneous with and art created after the Holocaust possess 
the potential to open the history of genocide to an audience, including those from other areas of the 
world: Cambodia, Rwanda, Bosnia. The total disruption caused by genocide is more defining and 
indelible than any other experience or individual characteristic; thus an authentic narrative about the  
Holocaust reflects the same utter disruption as an authentic narrative about the genocide in Sudan 
would, and vice versa. 
Along with physical damage and dislocation genocide causes a mental wound that alters the 
most fundamental ability of most people—language. After systemic persecution and systematic 
extermination victims find themselves bereft of the ability to use the languages they know, especially 
when discussing or describing the experience of genocide. When a survivor such as Georg attempts to 
use his native tongue, a language that has been used to categorize and destroy him, he finds himself 
unable to speak as he wants to—he is an exile from language. Lacking language, survivors can still 
create authentic narratives. Yet robbed of the fluidity of their native language and armed only with their  
own grim memories, these survivors and their narratives do not possess the reach of more popular, 
commodified narratives. Imre Kertész's novel Fatelessness provides an example of one such authentic 
narrative, the exploration of which can help determine a way to look at other narratives of genocide, 
particularly in relation to exile from language. When we instead privilege highly visible, commodified 
narratives set during the Holocaust, we sacrifice a crucial lens for gazing at the Holocaust's forgotten 
stories—and at the authentic narratives of other cultures affected by genocide, losing the stories of 
scores of people. If we ignore authentic narratives such as Fatelessness, we risk burying the narratives 
of survivors in a second systematic extermination, that of their experience. 
“Authenticity”, an ambiguous term at best, applies resoundingly to some narratives and not 
others due to the fact that some narratives dealing with genocide have become commodified, over-
exposed, and altered for greater appeal to the audience by the dominant institutions, detracting from the 
attention given to more realistic, less romantic narratives; thus even the creator of a work of art may not 
have the authority to credibly speak for the subject. The definition of “authentic” I use also proves 
imperative to my essay because it provides a way to distinguish between narratives that may exploit 
genocide and narratives that use an inadequate language as skillfully as possible to obey their own 
overwhelming need to narrate the story of genocide. The difference between the commodified narrative 
and the authentic narrative begins with an older definition of “authenticity” that forces an examination  
of who possesses the authority to speak. If the motives of the commodified or over-exposed narrative 
lie in the accumulation of profit or the reinforcement and propagation of a singular ideology, it seems 
plausible that the commodified narrative does not qualify as authentic, as it essentially usurps the 
authority of another narrative for purposes that may not reflect the desires or experiences of the 
individuals from whom the narrative originates. Kertész discusses the concept in the essay “Who Owns 
Auschwitz?”, mentioning that authenticity does not lie in the material details often meticulously added  
to commodified or over-exposed narratives for the pretense of authenticity (271).   “Material details” 
refers to the tangible specifications of life in the camps, which contribute vastly to the quality and 
character of the work but not necessarily to the authenticity. Both Kertész and his contemporaries Jean 
Améry and Primo Levi suggest that an authentic Holocaust narrative does not presume to understand 
the experience. “Authenticity” throughout this essay partially signifies the textual acceptance of the 
disruption of the Holocaust and a resignation to the unreasonable nature of the camps, an experience 
impossible to convey fully. A fictional account of the Holocaust warrants the tag “authentic” as long as 
the fiction (or the non-fiction, for that matter) does not assume or provide an explicable heroism. While 
this does not rule out the possibility of heroism during the Holocaust or during any other situation of 
genocide, it does eliminate the possibility of an anticipated heroism, motivated and manifesting in the  
expected ways. The revocation of heroism except as an improbably rare reaction in a bizarre time 
comprises part of the characteristics of authenticity within the literature of genocide. 
Thus, the character who fails to act in a traditionally heroic manner—for example, by 
attempting to mobilize his peers, by sacrificing himself for others—is not a coward because genocide 
rearranges these meanings. Genocide completely disrupts the normal patterns of life, and thus disrupts 
the normal definitions of words within that life. The authentic narrative of genocide acknowledges this 
disruption and refuses to fit the stories of the experience of genocide to the stories outside of the 
genocide, since the two cannot coincide. A commodified narrative of genocide would perhaps use the 
experience of the Holocaust as a stirring tale of heroism under the violence of the Nazis. In the tale the 
protagonist would find romantic love, come of age, or realize our shared humanity, etc.; essentially the 
plot of the 2008 film Defiance, the children's novel Number the Stars, et al. People do exhibit heroism 
during times of genocide, but these actions cannot bear the word “heroism” because the time of 
genocide proves too abnormally barbaric. The authentic narrative of genocide by nature reflects the 
absurd.1
Apart from constituting an “authentic” narrative, Fatelessness stands apart from other 
Holocaust novels because the novel refuses to restate any of the issues a Western audience may expect 
from art that deals with the Holocaust, such as the dyadic system of oppression created by the Nazis. 
Instead, the protagonist Georg spends most of his time describing the camps themselves with extreme 
realism and an utter absence of sentimentality. While Fatelessness' author Imre Kertész survived 
Auschwitz, Fatelessness is not a memoir of heroism. The linearity of the plot leaves little room for the 
protagonist to ruminate on the future or the past. He thinks mostly about his daily life in the camps, and 
occasionally dives into more philosophical musings about the significance of what occurs. These 
musings, which I close read and discuss, provide significant material for an exploration of language 
during a period of genocide. For example, the protagonist's clarity and rare bouts of curiosity often 
center around his inability to speak a foreign language, and his disengagement from his native language 
of Hungarian.
This absence of intentional defiance or hope on the part of the protagonist, while disheartening 
for the reader, presents an entirely new vision of the concentration camps as separate from public 
1 Here, I use “absurd” to refer to the tradition of twentieth-century literature that often implies “humanity's loss of religious, 
philosophical, or cultural roots.” Most of the art regarding genocide is not stylistically absurd (Benigni's Life is Beautiful 
provides an exception) but rather encapsulates the quality of the absurd that emphasizes “the lonely, confused, and often 
anguished individual in an utterly bewildering universe.” The key here lies in the “bewildering universe” that comprises the 
world for victims during a time of genocide. Yet the absurd provides an excellent context for understanding the authentic in 
literature about genocide: absurdist literature often alienates and confuses the reader just as the protagonist of the text 
struggles with the world, and authentic literature about genocide should alienate and confuse the reader. The crimes are so 
vast in scope, the justification thereof so mad, and the experiences of the victim so alien, that the reader can never approach 
full understanding (The Bedford Glossary of Critical and Literary Terms 2). 
assumptions about the camps both before and after the experience. Georg's matter-of-fact final message 
essentially states that society forces fates upon individuals, destinies which have no inherent 
relationship to their bearers yet which still irrevocably rob them of freedom. To Georg, freedom lies in 
“fatelessness”—rejecting the future expected of oneself.  This diverges sharply from what the audience 
may expect, as it comes accompanied by the idea that everyone, not simply the obvious oppressors, 
bear responsibility for allocating arbitrary fates to each other. In an effort to dismantle fate, Georg notes 
that if ever asked about the camps, he “ought to speak about...the happiness of the concentration 
camps,” a conclusion that both Georg and the audience can acknowledge defies expectations (262). In 
turn, this indicates that the author of Fatelessness has not succumbed to the expectation to produce the 
same narratives as other survivors and other authors, but instead seeks to produce a narrative that 
reveals his experience of happiness. Thus, from Fatelessness we receive a new narrative, one that may 
unearth a perspective that simultaneously defies and helps define anew the relationship between 
language and genocide. 
Much of Georg's story displays the difficulties of using language to communicate with the other 
prisoners, and in using language to express the experience of the camps to his family back home. 
Language circles back and confronts him as he hears from his audience what he should say about the 
camps, proscriptions that contradict his most memorable recollections. He also suffers from a lack of 
words capable of encapsulating his time in the camps. The language barrier between him and the other 
Jewish people in the camps renders him a non-entity among the same ethnic group to which he 
unwittingly belongs under the Nazi system of categorizing. The Nazis also use language to categorize 
Georg and the other prisoners into a few broad groups of formerly distinct sub-groups and individuals. 
Yet this does not indicate that language has failed Georg entirely. Instead, the camps have turned 
Georg's mother tongue of Hungarian hostile to him, robbing him of the language he had. This new 
version of Hungarian innately opposes Georg's existence, and therefore cannot replace his original 
tongue. Georg suffers not because language has failed, but because his mother tongue has exiled him.
As a prospective means with which to communicate experiences to other people, “language” 
denotes both written and spoken discourse. Discourse in turn “denotes language in actual use within its 
social and ideological context and in institutionalized representations of the world...” (The Oxford 
Dictionary of Literary Terms). Thus the following discussion of Fatelessness and language revolves 
around the actual uses of language within a highly ideological, highly institutionalized situation.  
Georg's story provides a particularly apt illustration of the limits of discourse since much of the 
struggle here arises from the actual, not abstract, use of language. The political actions of the Nazi 
regime led slowly to changes both in the abstract use of language, through the alteration of meaning, 
and in the institutional changes that damaged the relationship of others to their language. The 
manifestations of this damage appear in the actual changes in language suggested by Fatelessness.  
For this essay, I use Tim Wilkinson's translation of Fatelessness, a translation that has met 
greater acclaim than the previous English language translation. Yet even the best translations lack the 
same elusive nuances of the original text. These acknowledged limitations of translation heighten the 
inherent irony of reading a novel that addresses the limits of language in translation (Kertzer 111). 
Fatelessness discusses how genocide renders the native language of the speaker foreign to the speaker, 
in a language now foreign to Kertész through his own experience with incarceration, and in translation, 
an attempt to render a tongue twice foreign (to the author and to the translator) natural to the reader.  
Also complicating the notion of translation in the novel, Kertész deliberately keeps some of the 
dialogue in the various languages of their speakers, followed by no translation or a partial translation. 
Kertész additionally adds phonetic interpretations of Georg's amateur attempts at foreign language. 
Wilkinson then translates only the original Hungarian fully. Using different languages, as well as 
Georg's clumsy attempts to speak them, heightens the sense of divide between the language Georg uses 
naturally and the languages inaccessible to him. Justifications of reading Kertész in translation may 
initially seem worthless, given the material's explicit elucidation of the limits of language. However,  
because ultimately Fatelessness shows an individual's dispossession from language, the novel itself 
indicates that the original Hungarian proves as much a foreign language to the fictional first-person 
narration of Georg Koves as the language of translation. 
When considering this fact, along with the overall importance of examining this alternative text  
as an example of one of the Holocaust's authentic texts, reading Fatelessness—even in translation—
ceases to be a futile attempt at understanding and becomes instead a useful mission if readers hope to 
pursue a narrative alternative to the mainstream and institutionalized narratives that characterize the  
bulk of Holocaust literature. This in turn contributes to the overall sense of Georg's struggle with 
language, even his mother tongue. Georg cannot wrestle and best a foreign tongue or his own in order 
to convey publicly what he can barely articulate internally. Georg's linguistic exile and subsequent 
difficulties with communication raise questions as to whether his audience—and in the larger sense, the 
total audience for Holocaust literature—actually hears his narrative, or whether the Holocaust 
possesses a set of buried narratives like Georg's beneath the popular and predictable narratives, both 
fiction and non-fiction, that dominate Western culture. How can the audience recognize authentic 
narratives if these stories must struggle with inadequate language over the clamor of the dominant 
narrative? The Holocaust's importance as the contemporary normative case of institutionalized 
persecution means that it is imperative for the subsumed narratives to emerge if a Western audience can 
ever reckon with the other crimes that have occurred elsewhere and everywhere.     
For the purposes of this essay, which focuses on a Western reaction to genocide, “Western 
culture” denotes the first world nations of the Western hemisphere that draw upon a similar intellectual,  
political, and social history. The general influence of Hellenic and Roman culture, the Judeo-Christian 
tradition, the Renaissance, and the Enlightenment on Western Europe and the United States have 
established a common set of broad ideological and cultural assumptions. Politically, for example, 
Western culture shares a proclivity towards liberal republicanism.  Culturally, the West has worked 
exclusively from the same literary canon up until very recently. The shared cultural history of every 
developed Western nation has logically led to a shared set of norms; although each country differs from 
the other in specific minutiae, each country still works from the same fundamental cultural basis. This 
shared foundation underlies the repeating pattern of actions, reactions, and wants in “Western culture”. 
Imre Kertész considers the Holocaust, metonymically indicated by Auschwitz, as an inevitable end in 
Western culture: “What I discovered in Auschwitz is the human condition, the end point of a great 
adventure, where the European traveler arrived after his two-thousand-year-old moral and cultural 
history” (“Heureka!”).  The West cannot share a moral and cultural foundation without also sharing the 
Holocaust. Additionally, in an increasingly globalized world still in many ways determined by the 
legacy of colonization, the standard established by the Holocaust—a crime occurring during one of the 
last major efforts at colonization, World War II—applies not only to the West but to the West's 
perception of any other global crime against humanity. 
To inform my textual analysis of Fatelessness, and what the novel indicates about language I 
have consulted a variety of theoretical sources. The ideas I find myself most often referring to lie 
within a post-structuralist framework in the sense that I do not deal with the idea of truth as a 
determinate; rather, my exploration of Fatelessness and the broader idea of language during a situation 
of genocide relies on the assumption that the development and use of language remains subjective. 
Language here has no fixed meaning or power, but instead reflects the power structure. Power can 
consciously or unconsciously use language to limit, dismiss, and aid in the extermination of minority 
groups. However, language is not a simple weapon—any group or individual has power through 
language if capable of influencing through social or institutional means the actions and capabilities of  
another group or individual. Also in the vein of post-structuralism, I consider the world and language 
inseparable; as Geoffrey Hartman claims, “nothing can lift us out of language” (The Bedford Glossary 
of Literary Terms 299-241). I consider language a key factor in shaping the events of the Holocaust 
both in Fatelessness and in actuality. Whether or not the Nazis wielded language intentionally as a 
weapon, they did gain power from how and what discourse they used. It proves impossible to trace a 
direct line from one event to a discursive practice; instead, I consider power (and thus language) 
complex and subject to tension within itself, creating an undeniable but ambiguous correlation. 
 I also refer to Imre Kertész's explications of his own ideas, many of which inform my 
discussion of Fatelessness. Of course, Kertész's post hoc explanations do not constitute fact. While 
generally useful in elaborating on the relationship between language and genocide, his authorial 
explanations sometimes limit the possible interpretations of the novel and thus I do not consider them 
the final authority on Fatelessness. A few texts from other survivors also speak to different aspects of 
Fatelessness' attitude towards incarceration in the camps. The connection between the attitudes of one 
former prisoner to the next suggests both the multiplicity of non-mainstream narratives and the 
possibility of certain shared reactions unfettered by the expectations of the audience. Thus, the 
experiences and reflection of Primo Levi and Jean Améry often inform different qualities of and themes 
in Fatelessness. 
My exploration of language begins under the heading “Telling” with an explanation of why 
Western culture desires to know more and more about the Holocaust, and the reciprocal desire of 
survivors to relate their experience. I begin with this question because I feel that the phenomenon 
warrants further explanation before the bulk of the paper seems worthy of attention; if I do not establish 
the importance of the audience's fascination with the Holocaust, then the relevance of the following 
discussion diminishes. The second section, titled “Refusing”, discusses the actual disjuncture between 
the seemingly compatible desires to narrate the Holocaust and to listen to stories about the Holocaust.  
The second section seeks to disprove the assumptions of the subjects in the first section; essentially, 
why reconciling society with the events of the Holocaust remains impossible despite the tantamount 
desires to consume and produce narratives about experiences during the Holocaust in an effort towards 
healing and forgiveness. Reconciliation proves impossible partially because authentic narratives rarely 
become known due to the limitations of language. Language provides the tool for fate's imposition, 
here the imposition of an identity, a history, and a future upon an individual that does not necessarily 
cohere with the experience of the individual. Since language provides the mechanism for the 
unwinding of fate, a fate ultimately hostile to victims of genocide, the old language (the native  
language of the victim, whether it be French, Yiddish, Hungarian, etc.) becomes an inadequate vehicle 
of communication—but one with no alternative. Thus, with few ways to communicate, survivors have 
no choice but to succumb to using the old languages hostile to themselves. Declaring language utterly 
incapable or, conversely, completely without fault, represents a gross oversimplification of language's 
more subtle intersection with society. The conclusion of my essay contextualizes these ideas, focusing 
on the concept of the subsumed authentic narrative, with Fatelessness as an example of such a 
narrative, and the subsequent importance of authentic narratives in light of the fact that the Holocaust  




Every tragedy seems to pale in comparison to the Holocaust, regardless of the unique and 
terrible nature of every mass tragedy in the history of humankind. Instead of seeking out a variety of 
narratives regarding the Holocaust—or indeed any major tragedy—Western audiences tend towards 
consuming vast amounts of the same type of narrative. In Kertész's words, we watch the “saurian 
kitsch” of Schindler's List and believe that by watching or reading or listening we absorb fully the story 
of genocide, when actually we see only one closed narrative determined more by the culture in which 
the movie was filmed than by the circumstances of genocide (“Who Owns Auschwitz?” 269). Genocide 
affects too many people to compartmentalize the way Western culture has done, privileging usually the 
most easily adaptable of the competing narratives. Regardless, the Holocaust has become our 
normative standard for understanding and qualifying genocide, and from there our standard for 
understanding mass tragedy.  The discourse of the majority victims of the Holocaust—ethnically 
Jewish civilians—provides a bar for measuring and defining subsequent mass tragedies. Yet this 
standard is spurious if the discourse reflects not the authentic narrative of the victim but the 
institutionalized ideas producing the discourse. 
Despite the Holocaust's importance, the origin of the commodification and proliferation of 
Holocaust narratives remains ambiguous. A partial explanation arises from the fact that the Holocaust 
represents a great failure on the part of the West; moreover, it has a strong political lobby that 
occasionally reminds the Western powers of their failure to intervene, a theme generally present in art 
around the Holocaust. A Jewish lawyer named Raphael Lemkin coined the term “genocide” specifically 
to integrate the Holocaust into the legal world and from there into public consciousness (Power 29). 
Despite the fact that use of the word rarely prompts the swift action Lemkin hoped for in later conflicts, 
the word “genocide” still carries some strength—a fairly large grassroots coalition exists to combat 
contemporary genocide, specifically the ongoing genocide in the Sudan, whereas no mass 
consciousness exists regarding the war over resources in the Congo. Although many factors 
undoubtedly play a role in the consciousness about genocide, it remains true that genocide compels the 
audience of international tragedy in a way no other crime does. This in part lies in the fact that the first  
visible genocide, the Holocaust, seems to trump all other disasters, from historical genocides to non-
genocidal atrocities. 
Why is Western culture so obsessed with the Holocaust? Apart from the vast amounts of 
Holocaust paraphernalia, this obsession has emerged from a desire to shuck off the guilt for the event. 
The political considerations of Western governments during WWII attempted to justify 
nonintervention, and embarrassing examples of complicity abound in the American and European 
politics of the time; for example, Chamberlain and Daladier's acquiescence to the Munich Agreement's  
revocation of the Sudetenland. Apart from the strictly political aspects of nonintervention, many 
countries espoused a milder, sometimes non-institutional form of the Nazi's extreme racism and 
prejudice towards Jews, Communists, Roma, other ethnic and racial minorities, and homosexuals. This 
prejudice contributed to an ongoing endemic indifference towards international suffering. Historically, 
prejudice appears everywhere; perpetrators of genocide merely forced this prejudice to a murderous 
extreme, what they believe constitutes the logical end as indicated by their alternate title for the  
Holocaust: “The Final Solution”. Such indisputable and shameful manifestations of Nazi-esque racism 
in daily life heighten the public need for reconciliation with the Holocaust both for victims and for  
larger society. Philip Roth's novel The Plot Against America examines an alternate America in which 
the heroic figure of Charles Lindbergh successfully runs for public office on an pro-Nazi platform, 
betraying the possibility that the American people could have supported the Nazis. The collective dim 
realization of this same possibility compels the collective need to compensate. This desire for 
forgiveness ultimately proves selfish; it has the intent of cultural absolution, not the intention of 
listening to the real concerns of the survivors and concluding that reconciliation may prove impossible. 
Proof of this selfishness lies in the selective listening powers of the audience, as the desire to hear the 
truth is nothing more than a desire to hear the truth that the audience expects to hear. 
Given that the Holocaust occurred half a century ago, why do Western audiences still seek to 
understand and reconcile with it? The Hegelian drive towards reconciliation helps explain the West's 
ongoing desire to atone for the Holocaust. Since the Holocaust constitutes a major historical event, the 
genocide requires situating within a theoretical historical framework, which Hegel's dialectic provides. 
Hegel's synthesis considers the negative force of the dialectic the driving power behind the unfolding of 
history. This force seeks to come to terms with the discord within its own processes; thus, the push and 
pull of chaos and stability in history is little more than the endless attempt to reconcile history with 
itself. Since the dialectic deals explicitly with the historical movement towards reconciliation, it can  
help explain the unremitting (but ineffective) attempts towards reconciliation. Applying this idea to the 
Holocaust, the Holocaust should represent the continual, inevitable assertion of negative forces before 
the eventual recycling of stability and the reconciliation of society with the genocide. However,  
genocide exists outside of the dialectic because of the completely non-reciprocal wielding of power, 
which creates a situation of total authority and total helplessness in which the victims cannot surmount 
the oppressor and continue the dialectic because the authorities seek to completely eradicate the victim.  
While many other examples of non-reciprocal power exist, oftentimes the perpetrators seek to 
exploit the victims as opposed to completely exterminating them. The perpetrators' goal of erasing the 
victims from history and remaking society differs from other crimes, such as slavery, in which the 
perpetrators force the victims to become part of a sprawling system of violence and oppression, with 
more varied and less centralized oppression. Genocide stands apart due to the singularity of the 
perpetrator's vision of liquidation. Yet the drive to reconcile persists. Philosopher Vladimir Jankelevitch 
states “...let us reconcile because history urges us to do it, because such are the exigencies of life and 
necessities of good neighborliness...” (Jankelevitch 57).  Society wants to explain, understand, and 
account for the events of the Holocaust somehow. The means for understanding lies in locating 
information about the Holocaust, located in history and art. For the West, reconciliation may come with 
the full payment of collective intangible reparations—when the West can forgive itself for indifference.  
Whether deserving of self-forgiveness or not, the movement towards reconciliation proves unremitting. 
The drive for atonement manifests in the demand for truth or what appears authentic. In 
Fatelessness, Georg faces this urge upon returning to Bucharest when a journalist confronts him:
But anyway, the most important aspect right now, he [the journalist] considered was not 
that so much as “the healing of still-bleeding wounds and punishment of the guilty.” 
First and foremost, however, “public opinion has to be mobilized” and “apathy, 
indifference, even doubts” dissipated. Platitudes were of not use at all here; what was 
needed, according to him, was an uncovering of the causes, the truth, however “painful 
the ordeal” of facing up to it. (251)
Here, the journalist expresses this desire for atonement; after the fact, the community finds itself 
willing to face the truth “however 'painful the ordeal'”. The journalist symbolizes the entirety of public  
opinion, as he literally communicates with the public and thus represents the collective expression. His 
emphasis on the truth as “the most important aspect” therefore illustrates the public's desire for the 
truth. The journalist also seems to place himself in that role by advocating for the mobilization of  
public opinion; he now clearly wants to work against the reaction of apathy that he may have expressed 
during the war period. His righteous indignation and devotion to publicizing the genocide seem sincere, 
but what prompts the sincerity? When the journalist and newly freed Georg meet, the journalist 
upbraids the conductor and passengers on a streetcar for refusing the penniless Georg a free seat, 
saying “More to the point, some people ought to be ashamed of themselves...” (246).  This indicates 
that the journalist believes that shame constitutes the appropriate response to public indifference 
towards the survivors. As a journalist, his mechanism for inspiring that public shame are personal 
accounts of “the hell of the camps” made public (248). This passage hints at the public feeling that 
reading narratives about “the hell of the camps” begins the process of healing for former prisoners and 
for society. For the public, this healing consists of casting off the shame incurred as a result of 
indifference. This in turn hints at the larger desire of post-WWII generations to rid Western culture of 
shame incurred because the genocide was permitted to happen, yearning for a clean slate. The journalist 
suggests that the process must remain open, since a newspaper provides the most public means of 
disseminating information; and collective, as indicated by the reference to “public opinion”. Continuing  
for half a century now, public opinion in Western culture still wraps itself around the Holocaust for the 
same reasons, and still finds it useful and necessary to atone by consuming art that plays at replicating 
“the hell of the camps”. The journalist's desire to affirm his vision of the camps, which he deems 
authentic, symbolizes the wider society's similar need. 
For example, the film Schindler's List attempts total visual authenticity of “the hell of” 
Auschwitz. As another contributor to art around the events of genocide, Kertész's view of the film 
provides a critique of commodification as well as an acknowledgment of the popularity of such 
mainstream movies. Kertész states: “It is said that Spielberg has in fact done a great service, 
considering that his film lured millions into the movie theaters, including many who otherwise would 
never have been interested in the subject of the Holocaust. That might be true” (“Who Owns 
Auschwitz?” 269) Although Kertész later lambasts the film, the initial sentiment indicates a truth about  
Western culture: that art provides an intriguing, often accessible entry into historical events that might  
elude the audience otherwise. Kertész indicates that despite his poor opinion of the film, a robust 
audience exists for the Holocaust. Furthermore, some people consider it important that this audience 
has access to the Holocaust, even through the eyes of those who may not authentically portray its 
history and instead reflect the culture of the film's creation. To continue demonstrating this fascination 
with the grim details of the Holocaust, some reviews in mainstream publications of Schindler's List  
shed light on the reception of the film. A New York Times review asserts that “Mr. Spielberg has made 
sure that neither he nor the Holocaust will ever be thought of in the same way again.”   With similar 
praise, a Variety review deems the film “...not, strictly speaking, a concentration camp movie but a 
densely woven personal drama with the most striking of historical backdrops, which is what will get 
mainstream audiences through it” (Maslin 1; McCarthy 1).  Both publications suggest the importance of 
this film as a channel to view the Holocaust or to hook mainstream viewers, and generally demonstrate 
the prevailing view that the trend regarding the Holocaust leans towards more exposure, more material,  
and more fiction about the Holocaust. The Variety review in particular (though perhaps inadvertently) 
speaks to the commodification of genocide by considering the Holocaust “the most striking of 
historical backgrounds”, which trivializes the situation as little more than scenery, and privileges the 
appealing and heroic plot. All of this fiction staves off a need in Western consciousness for an eventual 
sense of redemption or forgiveness for complicity. However, when the material consumed proves 
overexposed or commodified, the process of seeking reconciliation results in an endless subtraction of 
knowledge, as if each overexposed piece detracts from the total substance of what the audience 
consumes. Occasionally narratives of genocide become devalued through overexposure and 
commodification, and thus cease to speak for the victims; as Kertész mentions, “More and more often, 
the Holocaust is stolen from its guardians and made into cheap consumer goods” (“Who Owns 
Auschwitz?” 268 ). The new narrative—for example, Schindler's List—may have good intentions, but 
ultimately perpetuates the commodification of tragedy.  
The Urge to Narrate
While the audience may feel compelled to hear the narrative, the victims also feel an innate  
drive to narrate in order to “keep death at a distance” (Foucault, “Language and Infinity” 59).  For those 
who suffer mass tragedy, there intuitively arises a much greater need to further stave off the death 
formerly so intimately around. Additionally, survivors long for freedom from the burden of memory 
(Kertész, “Who Owns Auschwitz?” 269 ). Recollections of their experiences during genocide may 
seem all-encompassing, a shadow over their lives, but relating this experience helps survivors feel that 
their suffering may inspire understanding, and may confirm that the experience matters and has 
received recognition from others. Many authors/survivors struggle to engage in catharsis meaningful to 
both author and reader; for example, in the preface to his memoir Levi expresses that his public memoir 
allows him the chance for “liberation” from the burden of memory (Preface). Despite the reluctance of 
his audience to listen, Georg experiences this overwhelming urge to narrate his memories and thoughts 
when he returns to his old home. Even when met with an unfavorable reaction from the audience—his 
uncle—Georg continues speaking, “possibly to no avail and even a little incoherently” (259). His 
compulsion to talk about his time in the camps surges forth with such intensity that his uncle's friend 
restrains his uncle from interrupting him, sensing that they must accommodate Georg's need: “Leave 
him be! Can't see he only wants to talk? Let him talk! Just leave him be!” (259). However, Georg 
recognizes the likely fruitlessness of his speech. Liberation, then, can easily evade the prisoners. While 
Georg may hope for his speech to liberate him of the burden of memory, he remains pragmatically 
aware that talk could fail, and the effort could amount to nothing. Such is the nature of the prisoner's 
narrative—it overtakes the speaker; the listener must listen patiently; both eventually succumb to the  
force of the story. 
Language creates a mirroring effect in which it confronts an individual with his past, his future, 
and his own identity; this sense of replication occurs because of the reduplicative nature of language in 
which the individual hears what should happen to him, or how he should act, and accedes to the 
structure created by language. Kertész's protagonist Georg is no exception to language's formative 
powers. Georg's later self-proclaimed “fatelessness” occurs because he considers himself outside of the 
fate others might expect him to endure in the camps.  In Foucault's exploration of Ulysses, a hidden 
Ulysses hears a bard telling the story of Ulysses' own life. Ulysses treats the bard's retelling of his story 
as tragic, especially since the tale contains his own death and the subsequent mourning of his wife 
Penelope. Ulysses weeps as if hearing of a literal death because hearing his life narrated by a bard 
constitutes death—or fate. Says Foucault: “...Ulysses must sing the song of his identity and tell of his 
misfortunes to escape the fate presented to him by a language before language (“Language to Infinity” 
54). Like Ulysses, Georg escapes the exact fate of his peers in the camp because his recounting of his 
own misfortunes arises organically and in keeping with his experience, as opposed to retelling his own 
story as told by the bard, or in this case the journalist who confronts him as he makes his way home 
after liberation from the camps. The fate of his peers lies in the unwilling capitulation, through outside 
pressure or forgetfulness, to believe that their experience in the camps mirrors what they have heard 
about their experience in the camps, as opposed to their own memory; thus they assume the fate placed 
upon them. The journalist asks Georg for an account of his experiences in “the hell of the camps”, and 
after expressing his inability to imagine hell, Georg presents the journalist with his own description of 
life in the camps (249). Dulled by Georg's description of the slowness of time in the camps, the 
journalist says “No, it's impossible to imagine it” to which Georg thinks “For my part, I could see that, 
and I even thought to myself: so, that must be why they prefer to talk about hell instead” (250). 
Here Georg is confronted with the story of his own fate—hell—which he must reject in order to 
assert his own identity and have freedom. Freedom and fatelessness entwine in Georg's mind as he 
clearly envisions the fate thrust upon him by society as driven and determined not by himself or by the 
real sense of fate as unstoppable, but by each individual himself: “Why did they not wish to 
acknowledge that if there is such a thing as fate, then freedom is not possible? If, on the other hand...if 
there is such a thing as freedom, then there is no fate; that is to say...then we ourselves are fate” (260). 
While Georg lived through the fate imposed upon him, he thinks of it as not rightfully belonging to 
him, and he remains aware that others—not simply the Nazis, but his family and friends—accepted his 
fate on his behalf and helped place it upon him (259). In regards to his family and friends Georg says 
“They too had known, foreseen everything beforehand, they too had said farewell to my father as if we 
had already buried him...” (260). For Georg, fate does not come from a higher power, but from humans 
themselves, and thus the notion of “fatelessness” comes from a desire for the freedom he remained 
bereft of both before and after the camps. Georg anticipates upon returning home that his mother would 
dictate the “inescapable” course of his life (262). His only recourse, then, lies in telling the truth about 
his experience in the camps—the unexpected happiness. Georg can only remain in a state of 
“fatelessness” if he can also remember the camps the way he wants to; as he concludes, “If indeed I am 
asked. And provided I myself don't forget.” To avoid death—his expected fate—Georg must narrate his 
surprising experience of realizing that “even there, next to the chimneys, in the intervals between the 
torments, there was something that resembled happiness” (262). Yet even with the desire to stave off 
fate through narration, Georg may find himself subsumed beneath the expectations of the audience and 
chained once again to a fate he never asked for. 
II
REFUSING  
The Impossibility of Reconciliation
Truth and reconciliation, long a desired destination in healing the political wounds of a country, 
provide a possible intention behind the proliferation of Holocaust literature. In many ways the 
exploration of narrative around conflict does allow some first steps towards reconciliation. Hegel's 
dialectic, as mentioned before, asserts the drive for reconciliation and forgiveness over time, an 
inevitable recurring process towards the “dialectical must of reconciliation” (Friedland 57). Yet the 
mass tragedy of the Holocaust and subsequent genocides have rent the dialectic, and now exist outside 
of time and history. Firstly, genocidal regimes seek to remove the victims of the genocide from history, 
as Primo Levi suggests in his memoir Survival in Auschwitz: “For us, history had stopped” (117). Once 
removed forcibly from their homes and lives and marked for extermination, the normal flow of history 
halts for the victims partially because the oppressors alter the passage of time for the prisoners, seeking 
to exhaust and exploit the victims until extermination. The loss of the prisoner's history also occurs 
because of the numbering system. Described as a “baptism” in Levi's memoir, which implies a birth or 
rebirth, and remaining with them till death, the numbers tattooed or given to the prisoners suggest that 
entering the camp forces upon the prisoners a new history, the new history of the camps. Essentially the 
camps birth them anew into the world of incarceration until extermination, reordering their identities  
and lifestyle beyond recognition. For Georg, time itself begins with the earliest numbers on the 
prisoners. When asked his name towards the end of the novel, Georg replies “64921” in German, 
giving his new name in the language in which the Nazis gave it to him.  Georg later requires quite a bit 
of time to recall his real name, demonstrating how successfully the new history of the camps subverts 
the most fundamental details of the prisoners' first lives. Georg characterizes his return home only in 
relation to when he left it for the camps (237). For the prisoners, time's boundaries are the boundaries 
of their incarceration.
The numbering system, apart from removing the prisoners from their self-identified names and 
thus the linear structure of their own history, also constitutes a violent act of renaming. Naming, says 
Dawes, “is authority's attempt to categorize and control difference” (192). The authority cannot use 
renaming flawlessly, but authority can attempt to control difference by using different names to sort 
individuals into larger faceless entities. Numbering people demonstrates one way of renaming the 
prisoners, shown by Georg's inability to remember more than his number. Numbering also removes the 
prisoners from language and renders them a commodity, as numbers dehumanize the individual. 
Naming prisoners as part of a few broad groups—i.e. Communist, Jew, Criminal—demonstrates the 
control of difference. Exerted through naming, this control seeps successfully into the ideology of the 
victims, who begin to view themselves in these groups and by their numbers as opposed to by their 
own previous identities. 
Thus, the Holocaust denies the dialectic necessity of reconciliation (Friedland 57). As 
mentioned earlier, the dialectic of history moves towards reconciliation. However, the Holocaust—and 
any genocide—stands outside of history because of the totality of the disruption both practically and in 
the minds of the prisoners. Genocide completely upends the lives of the targeted group; it causes 
confusion and anguish related to identity that proves completely insurmountable. Afterwards, members 
of the oppressors and the victims must often continue living side by side, expected to recreate a society 
after the destruction of the original society. Genocide confounds all expectations; each event horrifies  
anew. Like colonization more than war, at the conclusion of the genocide victims must regain normalcy 
despite the inherent strangeness of acquiescing to barbarity in their own homes, and later remaining in 
the same place where the barbarities first occurred—endlessly haunted by the genocide. The only other 
option for victims lies in fleeing their home completely and creating yet another life somewhere new.  
For example, imagine the cognitive dissonance arising if a victim (as has happened in Rwanda) goes to 
a store and recognizes the grocer as a murderer. Or, as in Bosnia, moving from a refugee camp back 
home, and realizing that the new neighbors belong to the ethnic group of the perpetrators of genocide 
who have capitalized on the murder of the previous owners to inhabit the abandoned home. These 
bizarre situations seem unlike anything else that would arise after other situations of conflict, and quite 
unprecedented historically. It is as if the society affected by genocide were a completed puzzle, shaken 
apart and then put back together with several pieces missing and some new pieces; no one believes that 
the second puzzle and the first are the same, but everyone must pretend the opposite. Thus genocide 
does not belong in the normal cyclical progression of history, as it disrupts history so thoroughly that 
the dialectic tendency towards reconciliation fails to suture the wounds. 
 However, the same tearing away from history caused by genocide that completely removes the 
victims from history can also provide solace to the victims when the genocide ends. Says Kertész: “The 
experience was about solitude, a more difficult life, and the things I have already mentioned - the need 
to step out of the mesmerizing crowd, out of History, which renders you faceless and fateless” 
(“Heureka!”). “Mesmerizing crowd” refers to the audience, demanding a certain narrative; “History” is 
the same history that ceases for the prisoners. In the aftermath of genocidal events, remaining outside 
of history—rejecting another fate—can provide more comfort to victims than trying to reintegrate 
entirely into society and attempting the total stability urged by the process of reconciliation. Kertész 
suggests that for former prisoners, the attempt to reenter history might prove impossible, and may deny 
them any chance of freedom. Since they experienced an event that exists outside of history, they must 
remain outside of history in order to avoid having their freedom and their memories of the event altered 
by the “mesmerizing crowd”.  This in turn privileges the truth of the mesmerizing crowd, which 
reinforces the dominant institution again at the expense of the victims. This would not free the victims 
from the burden of memory—it would bury the truth.
The Alternate Experience
Georg's experience defies the expectations of audience and provides an example of why 
authentic narratives should not disappear, as his experience lends insight into the mechanisms of 
language and the formation of identity during genocide, insight that does not emerge from the dominant 
narrative. Kertész's humble protagonist Georg undergoes a brutal imprisonment because of the Jewish 
identity ascribed to him, and undergoes further marginalization from the Jewish community within the 
camp. Why is Georg isolated by his own people, all of them equally targets for extermination? 
Holocaust literature has bifurcated all those who lived through World War II into oppressor or victim. 
Fatelessness shows that the limited binaries of German/Jew, Axis/Allies, guard/prisoner fails entirely to 
show the subtlety of any experience. The audience—the inheritors of mass tragedy—presumes to 
divide experience as if tragedy as horrific in scale as any genocide can be compartmentalized. Fiction
—the West's attempt at atonement—has squeezed the nuance from the Holocaust in a blind, 
reductionist search for reconciliation. Fatelessness does not deny in any way the horror of the camps, 
but it does beg the question as to whether the contemporary idea of the victims encapsulates all the 
victims, or whether this idea still privileges one narrative at the expense of others. 
 Georg initially seems only cursorily concerned with the current political implications of his 
ethnic identity, which he stays constantly aware of only because of discrimination and the unremitting 
reminder of the yellow star on his lapel. Georg rejects the forced dichotomy that the Nazi institution 
creates:
It was a slightly uncomfortable feeling going around with them like that, as a 
trio, yellow stars on all three of us. The matter is more a source of amusement
to me when I am on my own, but together with them it was close to embarrassing (9).
The passage initially suggests a repudiation of the group, here applying to his stepmother and his father. 
At first glance Georg's embarrassment with his family seems understandable as the natural 
awkwardness of a teenager. Yet this discomfort merely serves to demonstrate Georg's larger discomfort 
with placement within the context of Jewish identity. Use of “trio” and “three” suggests Georg's 
aversion to groupings in general, and implies his sense of individualism. Alone, he does not regard with 
much seriousness the submergence of his identity beneath a larger identity. With others, it becomes 
embarrassing, and Georg's discomfort arises in part because he cannot access his individuality in a trio, 
let alone an entire religious group he barely associates with. Of course, this star is not simply 
embarrassing; rather, it marks him for the concentration camps. Like the numbering system, the yellow 
stars and prison identity badges represent authority's attempt to rename and reshape existing identities 
in an effort to control them within the logic of their institution. 
Georg recognizes the ideologies dictating his new, infallible characterization as a Jew, as in this 
transaction with a gentile butcher :
Somehow, from his angry look and his deft sleight of hand, I suddenly understood why 
his long train of thought would make it impossible to abide Jews, for otherwise he would
have had the unpleasant feeling that he was cheating them. As it was, he was acting in 
accordance with his convictions, his actions guided by the justice of an ideal, though 
that, I had to admit, might of course be something else entirely (12).
Here Georg's assumption about the butcher evokes an older stereotype of Jewish merchants cheating 
their clients. This interaction, in addition to Georg's hyperawareness of the yellow star's symbolism, 
indicates that Georg, if not the reader, understands the potentially disastrous consequences of 
ideologies attached to reality with no inherent ontological significance. The stereotype, indeed,  
constitutes an object both separate from reality, and subject to varied thoughts; it possesses an existence 
above the attitudes of both Georg and the butcher (Prado 131). Kertész's use of “thought” and 
“feelings” to characterize the butcher's prejudice highlights the autonomous nature of the bias—it has 
no foundations in reality but arises from the mental state of those exposed to it. Georg's identity in part 
arises from the imposition of such an intersubjective object as the Jewish stereotype upon his own 
person, as suggested by the butcher's worry that he cheats Jews.  The gentile butcher dislikes 
associating himself with a Jewish stereotype in his own mind because he may notice that he cheats 
them out of prejudice; cheating them renders him similar to the stereotype he has of them; he cannot 
stand to resemble them, thus he becomes angry towards them and the hostility becomes cyclical and 
ingrained. Even knowing this, Georg ascribes to this stereotype when first meeting the Jewish camp 
prisoners, whom he recognizes by their yellow triangles. Says Georg, “Their faces did not exactly 
inspire confidence either: jug ears, prominent noses, beady eyes with a crafty gleam. Quite like Jews in 
every respect. I found them suspect and altogether foreign-looking” (78). This demonstrates that the 
intersubjective idea of the Jew permeates the minds of everyone—a shared concept passed down 
through Western culture, instinctive to many, including Georg.  
 Part of the subtlety of Georg's experience arises from his contradictory, occasionally thoughtful 
reactions to situations like this, which differ greatly from the extreme horror or fear of many 
fictionalized victims. Apart from embarrassment, Georg's emotions fluctuate from boredom to 
discomfort and occasionally to contentment. While a contemplative protagonist, he neither wants nor 
demands much from his life. The binary of oppressor/victim, German/Jew in the case of World War II 
relies on the properties of the binaries falling into place on either side; Georg falls into neither. The 
audience may deem him a victim, but he does not deem himself a victim. Clearly, he does not consider  
himself a Nazi either. Yet he does not actively or passively fall into the category of the victim. In a 
situation of recognizable oppression, in an existence determined by the specific targeting of the racial  
identity to which others have assigned him, Georg is the truly marginal character because of his 
rejection from all sides. His position demonstrates the weakness of the prevalent binary. 
The characters who reject Georg have subscribed to the dichotomy, abandoning smaller units of 
identity and past experiences to reduce themselves to the identity their oppressors have forced them to 
shoulder. Thus, many of the Jewish characters in the novel treat Georg with very little compassion 
(though with few tangible means of oppression). Partially, the disruptive force of genocide completely 
changes normal reactions; thus certain unifying ties between people become more and more important,  
and diversity less tolerated even among victims. The most obvious and crucial determinant of identity 
as well as the unifying characteristic of these prisoners is language, as shown the following passage in 
which Georg meets some Jewish prisoners:
When I told them that no, unfortunately I didn't [speak Yiddish] that was it as far as 
they were concerned, I become a nonperson, they looked at me as if I were thin air or 
rather didn't exist at all. I tried to speak, get myself noticed, but to no avail...That day I 
learned that the discomfiture, the skin-crawling awkwardness which at times took hold 
between us was already familiar to me from back home, as if there had been something 
not quite right about me, as if I did not quite measure up to the proper ideal, in short as 
if I were somehow Jewish—a rather odd feeling to have after all, I reckoned, in the 
midst of Jews, in a concentration camp (139).
Language, thus, becomes the means to define identity in a reality where that identity has been marked 
for eradication. Foucault states that “historians have constantly impressed upon us that speech is no 
mere verbalization of conflicts and systems of domination, but that it is the very object of man's 
conflicts,” and nowhere does this seem as true as in the camps (The Archeology of Knowledge, 216). 
Not only do the prisoners use an inability to speak Yiddish as a reason to ignore Georg, but Georg 
himself feels shocked that not all Jewish people speak Hebrew (78). Here, language and culture 
manifest themselves the same way, and thus culture under attack becomes language under attack and 
vice versa. Genocide, as opposed to other crimes of war, revolves around this idea of eradication based 
on identity—the dyadic polarization and concentration of an identity for the purposes of obliteration.  
Georg's experience throughout the novel demonstrates the key position language holds in crystallizing 
the nature of identity, which here leaves little room for characters like Georg. He does not speak 
Yiddish, the language of solidarity for the Jewish people during this crisis—a language separate from 
the linguistic tradition of the Nazis and transcending above state boundaries, linking them as a people 
in the same way that the Germans pushed aside the considerations of their literal nation of Germany in 
favor of the transnational connections of their racial identity. Georg, able to speak only Hungarian and 
some rough German, has no place in the binary reinforced by shared language ability on the side of the 
oppressors and the other victims. All other obvious manifestations of institutional discrimination arise 
from this fundamental ideological and linguistic construction of identity. Language has created the  
division and also the justification for extermination, and provides the institutional mechanism for  
oppression. Language also allows the victimized group a way to express solidarity, and through that 
solidarity exclude others in the same position as they.
In another event, a Finnish Jew sells Georg some potato peelings at a high price because “Di bis 
nist ki yid,” or “You no Jew” (164). Georg responds with “So why am I here, then? Lousy Jew!” (164). 
The episode points to Georg's stress over the irony of his situation, and how he fails to benefit in any 
way from his Jewish identity. His angry retort of “Lousy Jew!” illustrates further his isolation and 
inability to become part of the group. Use of Yiddish in this situation heightens audience awareness of 
Georg's stress; since the audience also cannot understand the Finnish Jew, the audience can more 
strongly sympathize with Georg's inability. However, this event signals some of the entrapment of the 
assigned identity. Georg interacts again with the most pervasive stereotypes about Jewish identity, that 
of the stingy and profit-concerned Jew. His reactions consist of affirming this stereotype, and the 
event's inclusion in the novel again reinforces the stereotype. His failed attempt at haggling underscores 
this difference as well, since he clearly cannot negotiate in the same seemingly skillful or crafty way 
that the Jewish Finn can. Yet Georg, trapped in the camps, does not recognize his absorption of the 
determinants of identity, and chooses to express instead the same stereotypes that prejudice has fed 
him.
The adherence to a dyadic view of identity on the part of the Jewish victims represents the final 
capitulation to the German binary. Within the camps, all prisoners found themselves relatively equal in  
powerlessness based on their religious identity, regardless of national background. While in their home 
countries the Nazis may have selected them based on many things—ethnic or religious identity, 
political affiliation, sexual orientation—to their jailers in the camps they are all prisoners slated for  
death. To put it differently, the Germans view most of the prisoners alike, with only a few exceptions 
for higher skill-based camp labor. The prisoners group together in their own version of the binary—
each specific group the victim, with even other prisoners considered inimical. Jean Améry speaks 
specifically of the prisoner's absorption of the SS logic: “After a certain time there inevitably appeared 
something that was more than mere resignation and that we may designate as an acceptance not only of 
the SS logic but also of the SS system of values” (11). Although an intellectual such as Améry may 
have a more sophisticated awareness of this internalization, all prisoners—including Georg—inevitably 
fall prey to the ideology of the oppressor. 
 Of course, the binary espoused by the ideology does not exist. Rather, through the tools of 
discourse the Germans foster an opposition of no ontological significance but a great deal of practical 
significance. Yet though Georg occasionally questions SS values, as demonstrated by examination of 
his own Jewish identity, he also unconsciously espouses the same SS ideology. The conclusion of the 
novel speaks somewhat to his eventual rejection of the SS values, but during his time in the camps 
Georg accepts both the logic and the values of the SS. As Amery suggests in At the Mind's Limit, 
genocide provides few alternatives to this acceptance. The disruption and barbarity of genocide leads 
often to such weary resignation. When moving from one camp to another, Georg remarks with all 
seriousness:
Despite all deliberation, sense, insight, and sober reason, I could not fail to recognize 
within myself the furtive and yet—ashamed as it might be, so to say, of its irrationality
—increasingly insistent voice of some muffled craving of sorts; I would like to live a 
little bit longer in this beautiful concentration camp (189).
The “muffled craving” arises from Georg's slow dwindling into the territory of hopelessness and the 
abandonment of his creativity and rationality. Yet at the same time it demonstrates a total assimilation  
of SS ideology for Georg to reconcile himself with living in a concentration camp. Use of the word 
“voice” suggests the connection between the absorption of ideology and language, as “voice” indicates 
a speaker who presumably would speak some form of language. Internally, Georg's language has 
changed, and now even his inner discourse reflects an absorbed hostility. However, it does not 
constitute a battle; the “muffled craving” is Georg. Although one set of desires demonstrates a 
backwards adherence to the mechanism of his own end—the Nazi ideology—this set of desires 
comprises as much a part of Georg as “all deliberation, sense...” etc. The integration of the 
institutionally dominant ideology proves extremely hard to ignore, especially after the torments of the  
camps.   
How does Georg respond to this complete marginalization? Largely, with indifference and the 
assimilation of a hostile ideology. Unlike the powerlessness of the Jewish victims, Georg's 
powerlessness seems total because he does not possess the ability of language (Yiddish) that would 
allow him to enter into a group with a shared language uniting them in some social solidarity. Thus for 
Georg the clear divide of oppressor and victim blurs, as both groups shunt him to the side (Amery 53-
54). His narrative, then, constitutes a true unheard narrative in the larger set of narratives around the 
Holocaust, as he has experienced rejection based on ethnic purity from both the Nazis and the Jews.
Limits of Language
It seems, finally, that two warring extremes face each other. On the one hand, Western culture 
adamantly believes that narrating or telling the Holocaust remains possible, as shown by the consistent 
appetite for stories around the Holocaust. On the other hand, many scholars of the Holocaust assert 
violently that in fact telling the Holocaust is impossible; it is, as Blanchot declares, “the limit of  
writing” (7). These two poles stymie a more subtle exploration of the issue at hand, which relates more 
to the entwining of culture and language than of a total failure of language. Georg's problems in 
assimilating with the Jewish prisoners lies in his inability to speak their language. Yet his native 
language, Hungarian, fails him later when he finds himself unable to speak about the time he spent in 
the camps, as demonstrated by his inability to construct metaphors to facilitate his audience's 
understanding of the experience (248). In essence, Georg has been exiled from his mother tongue.
 One initial reason for language's increasing hostility towards Georg lies in his body's hostility 
towards him. Fatelessness routinely suggests a strong connection between language and the body, 
together the most fundamental elements of a person. Georg's indifference in the camps is not the “slack 
boredom of repression” but rather a total disintegration in the face of an overwhelming horror and the 
usurpation of authority, especially authority over his own body (Kristeva 2). Such physical 
disintegration, in turn, helps explain why other aspects of a person dissolve. Compassion ceases to exist 
and hope disappears when the tangible vehicle of one's self cannot obey self-will. Georg's feeling of 
powerlessness mirrors closely the reaction Julia Kristeva locates and calls “abjection.” States Kristeva: 
“It is thus not lack of cleanliness or health that causes abjection, but what disturbs identity, system, 
order” (4).. Georg experiences this disruptive experience when a knee wound troubles the tenuous order 
he creates for himself within the camp:
There was no way I could shake off my knee, however, and an increasingly persistent 
pain in it. After a few days I inspected it, and for all my body's accommodation to many 
things by now, I nevertheless thought it advisable to promptly shield myself from the 
sight of this new surprise, the flaming red sac into which the area around my right 
knee had been transformed (173)
The knee represents the increasing feeling of helplessness that rises in Georg during his 
incarceration.  He must hide his knee from himself, as the infection has transformed the physical locus 
of normalcy, his body, into something disorderly and uncontrollable. While Georg alludes to other 
accommodations his body has made because of the superior institutional authority of the oppressors 
(for example, horrible lice), he cannot face his physical troubles entirely. He must turn away because he 
cannot fight the physical problems that torment him. The infection of his knee and the subsequent 
transformation of his body are physical manifestations of the same disease of his mind—pain in his 
knee and the hostile ideology of the Nazis seek to disrupt him the same way, upending Georg's control 
over his own world.  
 Georg's changed relationship with his body thus helps explain his changed relationship with 
language, as the physical stress of the camps drastically damages his self-perception: “Every day there 
was something new to surprise me...some new unsightliness on this ever stranger, ever more foreign 
object that had once been my good friend: my body. I could no longer bear looking at without a sense 
of being at war with myself...” (165). Georg's statement firstly indicates the powerlessness and 
abjection arising from the disturbance of his physical identity and the sense of beauty and order his 
body originally inspired. This horror and revulsion at his body's pain represents the disintegration of 
language; in Elaine Scarry's words, “physical pain is not only itself resistant to language but also 
actively destroys language...” (172). The ensuing physical separation Georg feels with his own body 
reflects the separation he feels with language. He characterizes his body as “foreign” and “stranger”, a 
direct response to the fact that his body's disintegration has occurred because of a foreign authority. His 
body now represents that foreignness, rendered unrecognizable to his self-characterization. 
The bridge between language and the body arises because physical pain such as Georg feels 
destroys every other sensation and all ability to reason, including the ability to speak. “Intense pain is 
also language-destroying: as the content of one's world disintegrates, so the content of one's language 
disintegrates; as the self disintegrates, so that which would express and project the self is robbed of its 
source and its subject” (Scarry 35). The contraction of Georg's world to his knee provides an example 
of this disintegration; as the pain occupies his world, he cannot concentrate on any other aspects of his 
existence. His identity, dislocated from his body by physical pain, spins off from the physical locus and 
becomes unanchored. Since language structures this world, his dislocation from his body also 
contributes to his dislocation from language. 
As the camps destroy Georg's body, so do they destroy his language, through pain both physical 
and mental. Georg suffers ultimately from what Jean Améry explores as homesickness for the mother 
tongue, a tongue that rejects the speaker. As a native German-speaking Jew, after World War II Améry 
found himself languageless and exiled by a tongue turned hostile towards him, a language embedded 
now with hatred towards some part of his identity:  “Every language is part of a total reality to which 
one must have a well-founded right of ownership if one is to enter the area of the language with a good 
conscience and confident step.” This implies that a lack of ownership may lead to a sickly or 
ineffective use of language, a problem Georg eventually suffers from but that has foundations in his life 
before incarceration. Prior to the camps, Georg still does not have a “well-founded right of ownership” 
to the reality of Bucharest by dint of his yellow star, which disturbs his normal activities: “I was about 
to unbutton myself but then had second thoughts: it was possible that...my coat lapel might flap back 
and cover up my yellow star, which would not have been in conformity with the regulations” (5). His 
inability to exist in the Hungarian reality manifests in his “second thoughts”, which show that he 
cannot behave normally because of the reality of Hungary, rife with regulations that constrain  his 
typical actions. The reality rejects specifically him, as indicated by the “my” before “yellow star”. 
Georg's reluctant bearing of the Jewish identity attributed to him leads to an utter lack of the 
“right of ownership” to Hungarian, since he assumes responsibility for the Jewish identity attributed to 
him. The Hungarians as well as the Germans have rejected the Jews, and thus the language of 
Hungarian now proves as hostile to the newly-categorized Georg as speaking in German would be. 
Later in the novel, Georg tells some fellow inmates that he comes from Hungary and subsequently 
finds them laughing at him, to which he thinks, 
That was unpleasant, and I would have liked somehow to inform them it was a mistake, 
since Hungarians did not consider me as one of them...but then I remembered the 
farcical barrier that, to be sure, I could only tell them that in Hungarian, or at best 
possibly German, which was even worse... (197)
This moment constitutes a sort of postmodern irony in which Georg finds himself trapped by the 
language of the groups he does not want others to associate him with. Bleakly demonstrating his 
linguistic exile, it seems clear that Georg's issue lies not in an absence of independent thoughts that he 
can mostly articulate to himself, but in an absence of an independent language unfettered by stigma 
with which to articulate these thoughts to others. He has neither his own language, nor the language of 
his ethnic group. 
Since language remains so bound by convention and by reality, it seems impossible to escape 
and form a new language with which to communicate with utter authenticity and authority. Even above 
the issue of his own tongue's new hostility comes the problem of common objects assuming new 
meaning counter to their original meaning. Such troubling of original associations begins the process of 
mutating an original language to a language that contains the hostile meanings of the Nazis. Although 
Kertész asserts that the Holocaust cannot have an “exclusive language” as that “would destroy those 
who speak it”, in many ways the Holocaust did successfully appropriate the languages of the camps 
(“Who Owns Auschwitz?” 271). Many mundane signifiers acquired meanings that forever damaged the 
original meaning; in the universe of the reader, “ovens”, “showers”, and “soap” have all accumulated 
grim configurations because of the Holocaust. For the prisoners, entire languages were transformed 
because of the camps. Although the Holocaust does not have an exclusive language, the events of the 
Holocaust have altered the languages that existed before. This alteration leads to a grim conclusion—
with no language, how does someone like Georg speak?
CONCLUSION: The Narrative Subsumed
When the question of testimonial arises after crimes against humanity, the audience commonly 
assumes that the oppressor's narrative remains preeminent in history. In World War II, the oppressors 
were the Nazis, and the victims predominantly (at least half) Jewish. But the assumption that history 
represents the experience of the oppressors does not reflect reality. The discourse of the Holocaust 
mostly represents the experience of one set of victims, and in this way has become the dominant 
discourse. Many pieces of fiction about the Holocaust reinforce and enhance the dichotomy created by 
the Nazis; us against them, German against Jew. Georg's experience, as illustrated by his linguistic 
limitations and the implementation of his Jewish identity, exceeds the binary by placing Georg outside 
of either of these categories. Although Fatelessness is unique, Georg's experience does not constitute 
the only situation of an indifferent, normal civilian persecuted for qualities he barely realized he 
possessed. Essentially, through the subsumption of popular representations of the Holocaust to this 
binary, authentic narratives and the testimonials of the victims become devalued. Fictionalizations are  
sometimes no more than institutionalized capitulations to the underlying ideology of the oppressor.  
Additionally, the narratives of privileged victims leaves out the experience of many—not simply 
Georg's experience as an indifferent adolescent, but the experience of a wealth of characters overlooked 
by the dominant experience. For example, Georg mentions several non-Jewish prisoners in the camp, 
including Communists, criminals, and normal citizens arbitrarily interned. The repetitive, 
institutionalized narrative no longer aims to stave off death, but rather becomes the new tool of power; 
the authentic narrative disappears beneath the false narrative. The institutionalized, commodified  
narrative may lay claim to the authentic narrative, but often cannot accurately or honestly speak for the  
true victims of genocide (Blanchot 7).  
It may seem as if the art around the Holocaust demonstrates the exact opposite of this 
phenomenon; that, contrary to expected human patterns, the survivors possess the stage upon which
to narrate their vision of the truth unfettered by the perpetrators of atrocities. Yet commodification has 
rendered this impossible. The truth known about the Holocaust—about any genocide—arises from the 
manufacture of truth by the structures of power (Prado 115). A plethora of material does not render the 
art of the Holocaust truthful; rather the generation of such material creates a reinforcing effect in which 
greater and greater amounts of art feed the desire for more and more of the commodity. 
Part of this commodification lies in the literal world of the all books. This essay focuses on a 
Holocaust narrative not only because of the Holocaust's reality as a normative standard for later mass 
tragedies but also because of the simple fact that very few publishers choose to nurture or consider the 
narratives from other mass tragedies. Very few English translations exist of the memoirs and fictional 
stories of survivors of other genocides; Kertész himself struggled under Hungary's Communist 
government to have Fatelessness published. So of the multitude of novels, plays, films, art 
installations, etc., few authors seem to have unique and personal vision of the experience of 
incarceration. In a strictly practical sense the book, the audience, and the market operate cyclically and 
in tandem with each other. The audience expects certain narratives and alters these expectations very 
reluctantly; the market for books reflects, guides, and capitalizes on these desires; and the book must 
then either function seamlessly within the market or disappear unread. Who knows how many new 
truths have vanished beneath the literary bulk of what commodification in part has engineered? The 
publishing industry, like fashion or services, both dictates and follows the will of the audience. Very 
rarely does a mainstream publishing company produce a novel about a crisis that might meet with 
indifference from the audience. And if the novel fails to sell, the narratives meet a second death in the 
acidification pulping process, in which unsellable books become inferior paper products. MIT Press 
Editor Roger Conover describes this process as a “holocaust” for books—the term fits, as the literal 
disintegration and the literal rejection or apathy towards the unheard narratives of genocide represents a 
second Holocaust, a second sequence of institutionalized violence (Conover). 
The ability to use language during times of genocide propels such material consequences as the 
absence of alternative narratives by mainstream publishers. Each narrative that vanishes disappears for 
one reason—the constraints of language—but the manifestations of these constraints prove manifold. 
The reduplicative nature of language drives expectations, both initially of the victim's identity and later  
of the audience's assumption about the style of narrative. Strong ties between culture and language 
render language hostile to those who have suffered through genocide. The combination of these 
restraints leads to the literal, logical progression into tangible occurrences: the authentic and 
unexpected narrative's rejection by publishers either afraid of indifference from the audience, or 
publishers intent on encouraging the propagation of one type of anticipated narrative. 
These tangible occurrences have rendered painful stories of the Holocaust the dominant 
language of suffering in the world, and this dominant language arises not from authentic narratives but 
from institutionalized narratives—the stories that the audience expects and desires to hear. The 
importance of this discussion of language relates intimately to the idea of the Holocaust as a normative 
standard for crimes against humanity. Awareness of the Holocaust develops nowadays comes from 
exposure to “saurian kitsch” and the occasional authentic narratives. Of course, the argument could 
arise that very little more can be learned from the Holocaust, or that the perception of the event proves 
too solid for alteration. Yet many new terrors arose with the Holocaust, terrors that have not 
disappeared and indeed which occur over and over again in different places, as ignored as the 
Holocaust during its unfolding. Cambodia witnessed a similarly bizarre and proportionately huge 
institutionalization of violence; Rwanda and Bosnia experienced a similar sharp polarization of 
identity. The lasting importance of the Holocaust lies in the preeminence of the events of the genocide.  
No language can arise to discuss or hear the narratives from another if the victims of the most 
prominent, recognizable international crime have no forum to voice their own subsumed narratives.    
The events of the Holocaust relate specifically to and can inform other genocidal situations due 
to the relatively unifying intentions and practices of the perpetrators. Thus, an exploration of the 
Holocaust can shed light on aspects of other events; for example, the issue of language during 
genocide, as in this essay. Instances of genocide diverge from instances of war; while discussions of the 
language of war can inform discussions of the language of genocide, the former discussion proves too 
broad to apply directly to the specific conditions of genocide. Thus, the literature of the Holocaust 
informs only a particular subsection of war, restricted mainly to post-WWII events. While there are 
cases of historical genocide; the term's advent in the wake of the Holocaust demonstrates again the 
importance of the Holocaust in shaping this concept. Technology and organization fueled the Holocaust 
in a manner replicated in Rwanda and Cambodia; of the major instances of genocide after the 
Holocaust, both Rwanda and the crisis in the Balkans mimic the skillful incitement of ancient and 
embedded ethnic hatred. Only in genocide does the keen and cruel targeting of civilians within the 
same country as the perpetrators occur. Otherwise, the event could become a war across state borders 
and different both legally and conceptually. Genocide involves a population within a state,  
exterminated by the state. Regardless of the legitimacy of the government (as with Cambodia and 
Rwanda) the effect remains the same: unlike war, where the threat to life comes from outside sources, 
during situations of genocide the threat comes from the very institutions obliged to protect even 
minority citizens. Just as faith in the mother tongue shatters when the language becomes hostile to the 
speaker, so do the physical events of genocide shatter the ability of survivors to exist within the same 
political structure. War, a much larger category, does not come with the presumption of systematic 
targeting based on race, religion, or ethnicity. These categories, as mentioned earlier, find definition 
through and by language, and prove crucial to the definition and implementation of genocide. Thus, 
genocide as a violent crime incorporates the linguistic dictates of identity in a way no other mass crime 
does—genocide relies on the formation and imposition of identity, and systematic extermination by 
institutionalized power structures. 
Given the critical importance of the Holocaust as a normative guide in the West's psyche, it is 
crucial that the narratives do not suffer oversimplification until they dwindle down into one essential 
story. Kertész points here to a formalized language of the Holocaust: “..it is institutionalized, and 
around it is built a moral-political ritual, complete with a new and often phony language. Certain words 
come to be compelled by public discourse, and almost automatically set off the Holocaust-reflex in the 
listener or the reader” (“Who Owns Auschwitz?” 269). Kertész speaks to the institutionalization of 
narratives of mass tragedy, and how the subsequent language fails to reflect the experience of the 
victims. A critic even of the word “Holocaust”, Kertész wonders at the development of a collective 
adherence to an institutional discourse around the events. One step further, this “Holocaust-reflex” not 
only conditions the Western audience to one pervasive and predominant idea of the Holocaust, but also 
has affected the Western perception of subsequent crimes against humanity. At one extreme, Western 
audiences reject the notion of any other crime bearing the weight of the Holocaust, or being as 
important as the Holocaust culturally, politically, etc. Yet the Holocaust does not constitute an extreme 
of genocide; instead it is the normative standard for the crime. 
Who knows how many Georgs remain from the time of the Holocaust, seeing an vision of their 
experience on television or in novels? And how many might exist from other countries? The Western 
audience has a version of the Holocaust; a version of the genocide in Cambodia; a version of the 
genocide in Rwanda, in Bosnia, in the Sudan. Georg's story in Fatelessness demonstrates that the lack 
of a language with which to speak may render the authentic narrative of genocide difficult, if not 
impossible, to find and hear. The commodification of genocide provides another explanation of the 
burial of authentic narratives. However, we in the audience must find and hear these subsumed 
narratives if we hope to truly see genocide. Reconciliation may indeed be impossible to achieve, but we 
have no chance of understanding if we listen only to the institutionalized narrative of genocide. This 
reinforces the powers already in place, essentially creating their fates—recreating their past experience,  
forging the rest of their lives. If we fail to listen to the subsumed, authentic narratives of genocide, we 
succeed in keeping the victims of genocide endlessly in a second prison of the fate we have imposed 
upon them.  
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